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I. THE 'IVORY TOWER': CRITICISM OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
A wave of concern about the existing methodological problems in human rights 
research began in Europe about a decade ago (Coomans et al., 2009 y 2010; McConnell 
and Smith, 2018). The methodological issue is not a new problem in human rights 
research. In fact, it could be said that it is a recurring problem rather than a new one, even 
though this has not been explicitly stated (Taekema and van Klink, 2011, p. 1). This is 
also true of other areas of legal research (or, more precisely, those originating from that 
field3). In general, the debate on methodology in the legal field is closely linked to the 
debate on the very nature of legal research and to the ultimate question as to whether it 
                                                          
1 The research leading to this publication has received funding through the project “La desigualdad 
compleja en las sociedades plurales. Indicadores para las políticas públicas” (DER2016-77711-P) of the 
National I+D+i Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Economy. 
2 Human Rights Institute, University of Deusto, Spain (dolores.morondo@deusto.es). 
3 In fact, as in other areas of legal scholarship, the discussion on human rights research methodology in 
legal academia does not revolve around the label of ‘method’ or ‘methodology’, but around the more 
general question of whether it is possible to obtain legal knowledge of a given topic, usually by discussing 
its normative meaning, definition, sources, etc. In this sense, the lively debate held in the journal Doxa 
(doxa.ua.es) in the 1980s and 1990s, and the discussion about Luigi Ferrajoli's theses on fundamental rights 
(Ferrajoli 2001) are examples of the discussion on human rights methodology. 
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can be descriptive, or whether it is necessarily normative in nature, as are the materials it 
investigates (Smits, 2009, p.45).  
 
From the mid-1990s onwards, human rights research has been a multidisciplinary 
field. It had previously been the exclusive remit of public international law, and therefore 
there had been no need to raise methodological issues or even consider the 
epistemological position to be adopted. The historical circumstances that had 
accompanied the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the precarious 
balance of the political consensus,4 and the period of intense production of international 
treaties that began in the 1960s had led legal scholars to deal with the mechanisms for 
guaranteeing rights, ignoring theoretical and philosophical issues, as advocated by 
Bobbio in 1964 (Bobbio 1990, p. 16).  
 
However, the increasingly multidisciplinary nature of this area of study has re-
opened a series of questions, starting with the methodological one. Important 
methodological shortcomings have been identified, particularly in connection with legal 
research on human rights, which is frequently considered to inhabit an ivory tower. The 
remainder of this section reviews the criticisms of human rights legal scholarship. In order 
to plan the escape from the ivory tower, firstly a discussion is provided of the new 
characteristics of the research context in which this methodological challenge is to be 
faced (section 2). Secondly, an escape route from the ivory tower is outlined that can 
serve as a basis for a much-needed methodological reflection (section 3).  
 
I.1. Criticism of the lack of methodological rigour in a technical sense 
 
Compared to research related to other social phenomena or produced by other 
scientific communities, the research conducted by human rights scholars has been often 
described as 'sloppy', which has the double meaning of careless and bungling, but also 
sentimental and emotional. In other words, human rights research, especially that carried 
out by legal scholars, has been accused of lacking methodological rigour from the 
technical and the subjective points of view.  
 
From a technical point of view, it has been found that there has frequently been 
no reference to the method used in human rights research, and much less a discussion 
about the adequacy or the impact of a particular method in relation to other possible 
methods of analysis, or its appropriateness to the research question (Coomans et al., 2010, 
p. 181).  
 
In the case of legal research, in particular, the method or methods that are not 
explicitly referred to are not even noticeable from the perspective of other social sciences. 
The legal method in general (not only in human rights research) is invisible to those 
outside legal academia, thus giving rise to the idea that legal research lacks a method. 
Methodology is also a non-reflective area or form of knowledge within legal research, 
                                                          
4 This is summed up in a well-known sentence by Jacques Maritain: ‘We agree on these rights, providing 
we are not asked why’ (Maritain, 1983, p. 94). 
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both in academic research and in legal practice, so legal scholars rarely know how to 
answer questions about their methods or their methodological training. In a short 
questionnaire conducted by Eva Brems about this issue, half of the people interviewed 
replied that they had never received methodological training but, above all, the same 
percentage responded that they did not feel the need to receive that type of training or 
discuss methods, unless they had to work in multidisciplinary groups or apply for research 
grants (which usually include a methodology section) (Brems, 2009, pp. 84-85). In other 
words, legal scholars who engage in legal research in human rights not only do not receive 
training on (legal?) research methods, but they do not feel the need for such training or to 
discuss the research method while they are among legal scholars. In fact, it is generally 
the interaction outside their scientific community that leads them to consider the 
methodological issue.  
 
Not only do legal scholars seem baffled at the questions about their method, but 
they also do not seem concerned about the criticisms made of their work because of a lack 
of methodology. This may be partly due to the fact that social science tends to judge legal 
research according to whether or not it uses social research methods, and whether or not 
legal research pursues research objectives and questions that can be understood from 
within empirical social science research (Feldman, 1989, pp. 2-5). Legal scholarship has 
been frequently accused of not being concerned about the effectiveness of human rights 
(Coomans et al., 2010, p. 181), for example; or about whether legal provisions for human 
rights really defend human dignity or not (Kennedy, 2004, p.24); or about what could 
have been the 'true' reasons for a State to sign a certain human rights treaty. From outside 
the legal community, it is usually considered that only the part of legal research that is 
closest to the social sciences (socio-legal research or research by the various ‘law & 
something’) is actual research. But most of legal research is doctrinal or dogmatic,5 and 
legal scholars who conduct it rarely feel challenged by that kind of criticism: their job is 
not to study the effectiveness of the norms, nor their political or economic 
appropriateness, but the effectiveness and validity of the norms within the legal system, 
which is a normative dimension of the rights rarely visible to the social sciences.  
 
Finally, legal scholars' lack of reflectivity on the legal method and its invisibility 
from outside the legal community make it difficult to comprehensively convey a criticism 
of the methodology: what is missing, what is not done, and the standards to be used to 
assess the validity and the scientific nature of the method. There is a good example for 
this in the above-mentioned study conducted by Eva Brems. After examining a range of 
legal research papers on human rights published in some prestigious international 
journals, Brems concluded that explaining the method used was not the norm in these 
publications. She also explained what had counted as a “methodological description” in 
her review; she admitted that a single phrase along the lines of 'the research question will 
be addressed through the analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights' was sufficient (Brems, 2009, pp. 87-88). Thus Brems’ review shows not only how 
                                                          
5 The discussion below will use the expressions 'legal doctrine', 'legal dogmatics' and 'doctrinal research' as 
synonyms. I am aware that there are differences between them. However, these would not be very relevant 
to the issues at stake here, and elaborating on these distinctions in an article of general scope would create 
an additional difficulty.  
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often this legal research in human rights is conducted without any methodological 
indication, but also the lack of guidelines on what it is and should be considered as 
method, methodology and methodological discussion in legal research.  
 
I.2. Criticism of the lack of methodological rigour in a subjective sense 
 
In addition to this lack of technical rigour in the selection and application of the 
method, human rights research is also considered to have methodological shortcomings 
from a subjective point of view.  
 
Some authors have attributed the lack of attention to research methodology to the 
fact that individuals who conduct research into human rights are often activists or were 
former activists (Føllesdal, 2009, p. 233; Coomans et al., 2010, p. 179). In these cases, 
methodology may be dispensed with because, if they ignore the demands and constraints 
involved in applying a rigorous methodological approach, scholars/activists can ‘point’ 
research towards the conclusions they previously established, a trap that leads to ‘wishful 
thinking’ (Coomans et al., 2010, p. 179); in other criticisms that used harsher language, 
human rights research has been considered to be ‘ideological’ in nature, as opposed to 
scientific. Andreas Føllesdal, for example, considers this research to be ‘normative’:6 as 
these researchers are activists, there is a tendency to ‘dull an appropriately sceptical 
attitude’ towards human rights institutions. Human rights research has an ‘agenda’ that 
seeks to promote human rights (or, in Føllesdal's words, the ‘legal human rights’ that 
national and international norms are, as opposed to the philosophical conceptions of 
human rights or philosophical rights, which relate to human dignity and/or social justice). 
This agenda causes the pronounced absence of internal criticism of human rights by 
human rights scholars. According to Coomans et al. (2010, p. 182), it is the 'passionate' 
belief held by these legal scholars/activists in the goodness and usefulness of human rights 
norms and institutions that leads them to direct their work towards improving and 
respecting human rights norms, ignoring that these are merely instruments in the defence 
of human dignity and that they may not even be good instruments.  
 
In this sense, human rights research - and again, in particular, investigation 
conducted by legal scholars - is accused of being lenient or deferential towards human 
rights institutions; and of putting itself at the service of the establishment by being 
reluctant to make any unnecessary (or even necessary) criticism of the activities and 
output of international human rights organisations. The research carried out by these legal 
scholars/activists is therefore unable to promote transformation, and it cannot even 
properly defend human rights institutions or the implementation of human rights.  
 
                                                          
6 Føllesdal makes a distinction between the ‘normative’ of human rights research and the ‘normative’ in 
political philosophy (his own disciplinary field). Legal research in human rights is 'normative' in a 
pejorative sense, since this 'normative' attitude is identified with the absence of the 'appropriate sceptical 
attitude' that should characterise scientific research, which borders on an also pejorative use of 'ideology'. 
The normative nature of philosophical research in human rights, however, seeks to examine the justifiability 
of norms and values (Føllesdal, 2009, p. 233). 
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In summary, it has been argued that the human rights scientific community, 
especially legal scholars, live in and maintain an ivory tower of abstract human rights 
research. Their research has been portrayed as being far removed from real experiences 
and from the actual effectiveness of human rights to protect the dignity of millions of 
people who are abused, and as being unable to create the conditions for ensuring that their 
knowledge output is appropriate.  
 
I.3. Separating the wheat from the chaff in the criticism of (the methodology 
used by) human rights legal research 
 
The criticism of a lack of methodological rigour in human rights legal research 
related to both technical and subjective aspects is not unproblematic.  However, I believe 
that both aspects are worthy of being taken into account to appreciate, and ultimately 
correct, the methodological limitations of human rights research.  
 
In order to better focus on those aspects of legal research methodology that should 
be strengthened, it would be useful to separate the wheat from the chaff in terms of 
criticism. This highlights a number of issues.  
 
First of all, it is striking that both the origin of these criticisms and the discomfort 
of legal scholars themselves when talking about methodology emerge in the context of 
the increasingly multidisciplinary nature of the field of human rights research. At least 
since the late 1990s, human rights have no longer been an object of study only for public 
international law. The interest that human rights have aroused in other disciplines 
enriches our knowledge about them, but radically changes the context of study. Human 
rights are a multidimensional phenomenon, so any monodisciplinary approaches (not 
only legal research) are insufficient to understand their complexity. In order to create new 
knowledge about human rights, we have to accept this new multidisciplinary landscape 
and provide the necessary interdisciplinary research conditions for fruitful collaborations 
to take place between different partial forms of knowledge. While the methodological 
issue is not the only aspect involved, it is one of the fundamental factors in establishing 
such collaboration.  
 
Secondly, a consideration can be made on the trail of the criticism regarding the 
weight of legal doctrine and legal dogmatics in human rights legal research. Many of the 
critical views on the work of human rights legal scholars do not seem to have a clear 
understanding of what constitutes legal dogmatics and what its purpose is.7 Hence it is 
necessary to give some thought to the relationship between doctrinal and non-doctrinal 
                                                          
7 Some of the criticisms really seem to be begging the question. For example, it is surprising that human 
rights legal scholars are considered ‘deferential’ towards Human Rights Courts and the monitoring bodies 
of human rights institutions because they regard their pronouncements as authoritative. The function of 
legal doctrine is precisely examining the norms within a legal system, and within that legal system, 
legislative texts and decisions by courts are authoritative, they set the boundaries of the legal order that 
legal doctrine assesses. Of course, one may be interested in other things (for example, in finding what the 
social impact of certain decisions of Human Rights Courts is), but legal doctrine cannot be deemed to be 
doing a bad job because it fails to answer a question that is outside its remit. If you cannot hammer a screw, 
the fault does not lie in the hammer.  
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legal scholarship (as it happens in other areas of legal studies8). Also, it should be 
investigated how legal doctrine can be productive to the other sciences; how its research 
results can be ‘translated’ for those outside legal scholarship; and ultimately, how to find 
methodologically appropriate ways to validate dogmatics against different external 
parameters.  
 
A third point of reflection - closely linked to the idea of the ivory tower - is that 
related to the limits legal doctrine has in doing 'criticism.' What can the role of criticism 
be in legal doctrine? How can critical concepts that go beyond identifying contradictions 
and gaps, interpretations or misconceptions be introduced, in order to propose 
mechanisms for resolution? Can a critical concept be introduced and rendered operational 
to apprehend complexity and design appropriate responses? Can legal doctrine accept a 
form of 'external criticism' that does not ignore the systemic nature of rules, the 
authoritative sources of interpretation, etc.? One which does not fall into 'wishful 
thinking', confusing the wishes, the claims, and the individual experience of injustice with 
rights? Can the concept of criticism of critical theories be introduced to examine power 
relations? 
 
A final consideration worth making at this stage, forced by criticism, is that a 
relationship between scientific reflection and legal practice is necessary in - and almost 
constitutive of - legal research. In the field of human rights research, this relationship is 
not only established between legal scholars and legal practitioners (human rights lawyers, 
judges, experts sitting in human rights monitoring bodies), but also with human rights 
activists who may not be lawyers (in fact, very often they are not). Can methodological 
reflection help us do human rights legal research that is not reduced to being a mere 
‘crutch’for practitioners' work? Is there such thing as basic legal research and applied 
legal research, as in the hard sciences? What is the difference between theoretical legal 
knowledge about human rights, and legal knowledge of human rights that is derived from 
both legal and non-legal practice, and from activism? 
 
II. THE NEW WORK CONTEXT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  
 
None of the above-mentioned arguments and criticism of legal methodology are 
new, nor have they changed substantially within legal science.9 However, as mentioned 
before, in human rights studies (and certainly in other fields of study related to social 
justice) questions are being raised that oblige legal scholars to explicitly rethink the 
methodological problem and to address it in a new way.  
 
Before concentrating on the two issues that I believe have radically altered the 
landscape of human rights studies since the 1990s, I want to emphasise the role that 
disciplinary multiplicity plays as a catalyst in the new context for the work of human 
rights legal scholars.  
                                                          
8 For example, in international law and European law (van Gestel and Micklitz, 2011; van Gestel et al. 
2012), in the history of law (Jensen, 2016), or in comparative law (Legrand, 2017). 
9 Suffice it to recall the work of J. von Kirchmann The worthlessness of jurisprudence as a body of 
knowledge (English translation) (Die Wertlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft, Darmstadt, 1848). 
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If one accepts the fact that there is disciplinary plurality in the field of human 
rights studies, the issue of interdisciplinarity and the methodological challenge that it 
entails also needs to be taken seriously. If what we can and want to know about human 
rights is no longer limited to the knowledge and understanding of the international norms 
that establish them, the analysis of the texts in which they are contained and the operation 
of the international organisations that are responsible for monitoring their compliance by 
States, it follows that we will need to have some mechanisms to answer the various 
questions we may want to ask.  
 
This is a key aspect in the new reflexion on research methodology on human rights 
(McConnell and Smith, 2018; Andreasen et al., 2017; Coomans et al., 2009) but one that 
is usually resolved by using juxtapositions. 
 
In interdisciplinary research, or even in research conducted by multidisciplinary 
teams, it is very important to establish forms of ‘translating’ between the different 
disciplines and epistemological and theoretical approaches in the research design stage. 
This will minimise the danger of ‘incommensurability’ between languages and research 
findings depending on the different methods used. In interdisciplinary research, it is 
necessary to move forward with methodological approaches and methods that can act as 
'chameleons' or as 'amphibians', adapting to different environments and their 
requirements. 
 
This task is clearly not to be performed by legal scholars by themselves. The 
construction of an interdisciplinary approach that goes beyond the juxtaposition or the 
substitution of some types of knowledge by other (equally partial) types, which is not 
dissolved in dilettantism or in a 'know-it-all' approach, and seeks to find a shared solution 
to new, more complex, multidimensional knowledge gaps, is a task to be undertaken by 
the scientific community as a whole. This process would ultimately transform that 
knowledge and turn it into a social production. This interdisciplinary transformation 
obviously cannot be addressed here.10 But it is important to realise that this is a 
fundamental challenge in the methodological scenario of current human rights research. 
If legal scholars (and all other scholars) wish to participate in that scenario, they have to 
act convergently, stepping outside of their ivory towers.   
 
 
II.1. The contestation of human rights 
 
This section deals with two aspects that change significantly the contexts in which 
the methodological issue needs to be considered. These two aspects (the contestation of 
human rights and the complexity of the human rights law system) make it necessary to 
deal with the methodological issue not only explicitly, but also in a way that is different 
from previous waves of concern about methodology.  
 
                                                          
10 See the contribution by Cristina de la Cruz in this same issue. 
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The first aspect is that the concept of human rights has become increasingly and 
more frequently contested.  
 
The 40 years that separated the Universal Declaration from the end of the Cold 
War saw the affirmation of human rights as a powerful mechanism of political 
legitimation and as a vehicle for claims from radically diverse groups. The context and 
conditions in which human rights doctrine became extended and established during what 
came to be called the 'age of rights' (Bobbio, 1990) cannot be discussed here. However, 
paradoxically, at the time when Bobbio coined this term, a process of contestation of 
human rights matured and raised new and old issues on several fronts. The old issues, that 
had not been resolved at the time of the Universal Declaration, delayed the drafting of the 
International Covenants and their entry into force, and meandered throughout the Cold 
War period. They included the opposition between political civil rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights, the nature of rights as a ‘natural’ limit to the State, and their 
international protection as a limit to the sovereignty of the State. Some new issues also 
resulted from the global geo-political conditions that arose in the late 1960s, the 
decolonisation process, the emergence of regional human rights protection systems, the 
fall of communist regimes in Europe, and the development of international civil society 
organisations. 
 
Since the beginning of the new century, a theoretical reflection has also emerged 
on the ‘human rights crisis’ (Klabbers, 2002; Hoover, 2012; MorondoTaramundi 2014) 
and the urgent need to re-found their doctrine. The human rights crisis does not really 
involve a new set of claims that are sometimes divergent or even in opposition to human 
rights as they were reflected in international human rights law. This process of 
contestation is not in itself a negative development, nor does it in itself discredit the age 
of rights, although it denounces some of its critical points. If we understand human rights 
as a corpus of rules, the processes of change and transformation of the law are inherent 
to the very idea of social regulation.  
 
The human rights crisis that has been theorised since the beginning of the century 
has other components. In his analysis of the crisis, A. Langlois opposes this critical 
literature (which he qualifies as an ‘anathema to the promotional propaganda of human 
rights that we are accustomed to hearing’ (Langlois, 2012, p. 559) to the naive rhetoric of 
the human rights movement that includes universalism, indivisibility, inalienability and a 
long list of new rights, treaties and mechanisms. It is important to note that what is 
described as naive rhetoric and promotional propaganda of human rights are not marginal 
details, but their main theoretical elements (universality, indivisibility and inalienability) 
and operational components (positivisation, internationalisation and provision of control 
and guarantee mechanisms). In addition, the theoretical contestation of human rights in 
recent years has not so much questioned the specific political consensus on which the 
expansion of human rights was based,11 but the idea of a political consensus detached 
                                                          
11 Indeed, many aspects of the political consensus around the Universal Declaration of 1948 may be (and 
have started to be) criticised (Jensen, 2016). 
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from the objective (or, at least strong and compelling) foundations of human rights 
(Klabbers 2002; MorondoTaramundi 2014).  
 
This is also, therefore, a crisis about the meaning of human rights, which has 
become undermined as they have been instrumentalised into playing a role in legitimising 
power. This crisis is also a struggle –not for rights– but for the meaning attributed to the 
expression ‘human rights’, including its rhetorical use in a symbolic function, the 
emotional pseudo-definitions, and the continuous prescriptive re-definitions. I think that 
the main vector of ‘rhetoric’ in human rights is this crisis and not, as Coomans, Gründfel 
and Kamminga (2010, pp. 182-183) argue, the mere fact that there are activists doing 
research or that human rights scholars –generally– want to improve the implementation 
and enjoyment of human rights.  
 
This is the context in which human rights legal scholars have to work today: a 
human rights legal system where political consensus has become eroded and a struggle 
around the definition of human rights that includes some of its fundamental elements 
(foundations, portfolio, guarantees and subjects). I believe that human rights today –and 
probably since the 1990s– have the characteristics of ‘essentially contested concepts’ 
(Gallie, 1956). Essentially contested concepts are those notions ‘the proper use of which 
inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ 
(Gallie, 1956: 169). These concepts involve a disagreement about the reasons for 
attributing a certain meaning to a particular linguistic expression.12 Gallie warned that the 
indeterminate nature of these types of concepts cannot be resolved by appealing to logic 
or linguistics. The plurality of meanings of the expression ‘human rights’ and the 
mechanisms for determining the dominant meanings are not related to either coherence 
or semantic or pragmatic correction (as in the case of ambiguous expressions or vague 
concepts), but to more complex theoretical debates about their role in society and their 
fundamental properties.  
 
II.2. The complexity of human rights law 
 
A key aspect in the consideration that human rights legal scholars live in an ivory 
tower disconnected from reality is probably the way in which legal scholarship deals with 
the peculiarities of the international system for the protection of human rights.  
 
From outside the legal community it is difficult to understand that legal scholars 
discuss whether a certain right exists without taking into account that in reality it is 
constantly violated by the authorities of a country or by private groups tolerated by the 
authorities of a given country; and that their victims have no protection from the law, and 
they are even often stigmatised and persecuted by law enforcement agencies and the 
judicial system. Likewise, it can be shocking that the existence of a certain human right 
that is claimed as such by millions of people can be denied, and that certain injustices 
                                                          
12 It is my understanding that the category of an 'essentially contested concept' is also preferable to the 
concept/conception distinction made by R. Dworkin (1977, pp. 134-136), because it compels us to consider 
the problem from an argumentative/justifying point of view that is, in my opinion, more fruitful than the 
analytical-conceptual framework of Dworkin's distinction.  
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cannot be categorised as human rights violations (Christiansen and Jensen, 2019; Alston, 
2015).  
 
It might seem that the human rights of legal scholars exist in a separate world, 
parallel to real life on the planet. And yet, the boundaries of that separate world are 
precisely the second aspect that changes the work context in which human rights legal 
scholars have to face their new methodological challenges. Burdened with the theoretical 
requirements of the doctrine of the universality, indivisibility and inalienability of human 
rights, human rights legal scholars have to enter a ‘legal system’ of a sui generis nature. 
Indeed, international human rights law has two sets of characteristics that alter the usual 
environments of legal theorisation (i.e. national legal systems) and that, by comparison, 
make it look like a ‘crowded house’ (Cruz Villalón, 2012). Cruz Villalón, Advocate 
General at the Court of Justice of the European Union, uses this analogy of the 'crowded 
house' to refer to the current state of fundamental rights in Europe13 in reference to both 
the rights that are considered fundamental, and to the people who deal with the complex 
task of declaring and applying them. While the intervention of Cruz Villalón highlighted 
how the judges of Constitutional Courts and Courts of Human Rights in Europe find it 
awkward to cohabitate in a crowded house, following this metaphor, I would like to 
discuss the difficulties that living in a crowded house entails for anyone who has to tidy 
up, find the belongings of each person in the house, and plan the shifts to watch TV there 
(i.e. legal scholars).  
 
That is, one dimension of the complexity of the human rights protection system - 
to which the legal scholarship has paid increasing attention (Brems, 2014; O’Cinneide, 
2009; Brems and Ouald Chaib, 2018; Bribosia and Rorive, 2018) - is its multi-level and 
multi-layered nature. In general terms, it cannot be said what a certain human right 
consists of (what it protects, what cases it covers, what its limits are, and who its right 
holders and duty bearers are). In different places, human rights are defined by the 
interaction of up to four levels of protection14 that could be aligned with, contradict, or 
complement each other. Even where the founding provisions contain similar or identical 
formulations, there is a plethora of implementers of those standards that may differ in 
their interpretations or find themselves in so-called ‘zones of friction’. Many of these 
zones of friction are jurisdiction problems or issues involving the application of legal 
concepts that the legal scholarship is called to examine and possibly solve.  
 
The other dimension of the complexity of human rights law is the multitude of 
rights; not so much because there are too many human rights15 but, as Cruz Villalón 
pointed out, because their sources are broad and heterogeneous (national constitutions, 
                                                          
13 Although Cruz Villalón applied the analogy in a more restricted way to the European protection system, 
I believe that, mutatis mutandis, it is even more valid when applied at a global level. 
14 International/global, supranational/regional, national and sub-state/local. See, for example (Marx et al., 
2015). 
15 The first decade of this century has produced vast literature around the ‘inflation’ of human rights, and 
the need to limit the rhetoric of their language and 'streamline' protection only for those rights that are most 
necessary in the defence of human dignity. I have examined some critical points of these doctrines in 
Morondo Taramundi (2014).  
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supranational declarations, charters of rights, international treaties). There are major 
differences between human rights sources according to their origin, age, acquired 
authority, symbolic function, legal force and guarantees (Cruz Villalón 2012, p. 3). For 
all these reasons, the legal dimension of human rights cannot be fully understood by 
applying a view of the legal norms that is indebted to national legal systems.16 Not only 
does the corpus of human rights law have a significant proportion of international law; it 
also receives a different impact according to the various sources across a broad spectrum 
of graded rules. These sources are not interchangeable, although the formulation of the 
right they contain may be; but they are not incompatible either.  
 
Therefore, it is for legal scholarship to elucidate the issues concerning to what 
extent human rights (which are configured in the interaction of multiple heterogeneous 
sources and in the practices of creation, interpretation and application of various subjects 
called upon for their protection) are legal in nature. These two dimensions, the multi-
layered character and the heterogeneity of the sources (including those that do not have 
full legal nature or are 'quasi-legal', 'soft law', etc.), have to be taken into account when 
thinking of human rights legal research as being necessarily different from the legal 
scholarship (doctrinal and non-doctrinal) that can be produced within national legal 
systems.  
 
III. THE ESCAPE ROUTES FROM THE IVORY TOWER: SOME CUES  
 
Let us assume, then, that we take seriously (albeit critically) the criticism of the 
methodological limitations that can be seen in human rights legal research today; and that, 
at the same time, we take into account this new multidisciplinary human rights research 
context, which has been shaken by the contestation of human rights and is extremely 
complex from a legal and regulatory point of view. This section outlines three issues; 
three escape routes from the ivory tower that could provide the basis for a methodological 
reflection on legal research in the new context. This endeavour commands a critical 
perspective that can contribute to the shared tasks involved in human rights studies and, 
at the same time, influence the real (although not immediate) protection of human rights 
and their values. 
 
The proposals provided below are not fully developed strategies; they are not an 
instruction manual and they are not accompanied by a series of methods (with lowercase 
‘m’). Nor are they alternative strategies to choose from. They are different elements for 
reflection on methodology (with a capital ‘M’). Specifically, on the questions that need 
to be asked and answered when designing the research study, to be used as guidance in 
selecting specific methods; in recognising the limits of our research; in identifying 
complementarities in other scientific disciplines and with other sources of knowledge 
based on practice; and in assessing the possible social impact and the potential of 
knowledge for social transformation.  
 
                                                          
16 Neither Kelsen's inverted pyramid, nor even Hart's rule of recognition seem adequate ways of thinking 
about these complex systems any longer (Smits, 2009, p. 55). 
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III.1. Disclosure 
 
The first escape route from the ivory tower involves engaging in methodological 
reflection and disclosing it. A conscious reflection on Methodology that is not merely the 
choice of a method to collect or to analyse data; it compels us (legal scholars) to position 
ourselves in the theoretical and epistemological panorama of scientific research and 
human rights studies.  
 
This is undoubtedly easier in the field of non-doctrinal legal research, in the 
various sub-disciplines of law & something and in law-in-context studies. In these areas, 
legal research can avail itself of the theoretical and methodological reflections of the 
disciplines that law is related to. But the fact that there is a well-trodden path does not 
mean that there are no further steps to take. The methodological reflection of 
multidisciplinary approaches in legal research should always adopt a self-analytical 
attitude to avoid a gradual movement away from the practice of law that may render it 
irrelevant to the understanding and transformation of law. In a review of the US debate 
on legal scholarship and methodology, van Gestel and Micklitz (2011) showed a fracture 
between two sides: ‘multidisciplinarians’ and ‘doctrinalists.’ Although 
multidisciplinarians take the credit and the intellectual reputation in elite universities, 
legal doctrine is still the foundation of legal education. In addition, their analysis showed 
that there are signs of a trend reversal in terms of considering ‘black letter law’ 
scholarship to be dead. This and other studies warn of the danger that the increasing 
instrumentalisation of law may reduce legal research to a mere policy instrument (van 
Gestel et al., 2012, p. 20).   
 
This explicit reflection on the theoretical and methodological positions is even a 
greater challenge in the investigation of legal doctrine or legal dogmatics. In fact, many 
authors who have addressed the problem have opted to abandon legal doctrine in favour 
of multidisciplinary approaches in the study of law. This is not the position endorsed here. 
There is no reason to believe that if legal scholars engaged in discussions about objects 
other than rules, such as human dignity or democracy (as some do), their work would be 
of a higher methodological standard than their production as legal scholars. Much to the 
contrary. Nor is there any reason to believe that legal scholarship would be of better 
quality if it adopted methods from other disciplines, such as empirical research methods.17 
Therefore, let legal scholars do their job. The escape route from the ivory tower does not 
require that legal doctrine or dogmatics disappear. The need for engaging in and 
disclosing methodological reflection does not mean that doctrine has no role in the new 
context of human rights research, or that legal scholars have to improvise or become 
recycled into something else (sociologists of law, or experts in legal anthropology or 
legal-social psychology). 
 
Taking criticism and the new context seriously implies that legal doctrine can 
improve. A legal dogmatics of human rights can surely go beyond merely commentating 
                                                          
17 Empirical legal research has grown significantly (van Dijck et al., 2018). However, critical voices have 
also emerged about its limits in terms of its production of knowledge about law (Leeuw, 2015). 
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on and glossing judgments and new rules; it can contribute more than by simply 
uncritically systematising normative data and the techniques used to resolve 
contradictions or indeterminacies in the system. The methodological turn in the legal 
doctrine would also oblige legal scholars to learn to ‘translate’ and share our knowledge 
with other disciplines; to learn to incorporate the knowledge produced by other 
disciplines; and to understand the ways of ‘leveraging’ legal research outputs into wider 
and more complex environments than the relatively homogeneous communities of their 
legal scholar colleagues. Improving legal doctrine does not mean making it more similar 
to ‘multi-disciplines’ (the various ‘law & something’ or law-in-context disciplines), but 
to refine its own nature.  
 
III.2. Critique 
 
A second escape route from the ivory tower is to make legal research more aware 
of the relationship between the human rights rules that are analysed and the power they 
contain and represent.  
 
According to the traditional understanding of doctrine, legal scholars criticise the 
‘failures’ of the legal system (contradictions, gaps, the indeterminacy of law) and propose 
solutions for the self-integration of the system. In other words, criticism means detecting 
errors and proposing solutions, but within the legal system,18 in order to improve the 
functioning of law. 
 
In my opinion, criticism can have two additional meanings, both of which can 
have a place in human rights legal research, including the legal doctrine of human rights.  
 
On the one hand, criticism can refer not simply to the detection of ‘errors’, but to 
the analysis of complexity. A critical study of legal doctrine, in this sense, would not only 
be devoted to identifying contradictions and proposing solutions de lege ferenda for the 
(better) protection or legal guarantee of a right, but would examine the ‘errors’ 
(contradictions, gaps or indeterminacies) found in relation to differentiated factors, both 
internal and external to the human rights law system. In this area, the law can be deemed 
to be a ‘discipline in transition’, to use the expression of the Dutch Evaluation Agency 
(in van Gestel et al., 2011, p. 2). It is a discipline that is facing a move towards more 
internationalised and globalised studies, towards reducing the predominance of legal 
practice within its purpose, towards multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, and 
towards abandoning implicit traditions in favour of methodological approaches. Indeed, 
the approaches that have tried to deal with the idea of criticism as an understanding of 
complexity are numerous: for example, studies of the multi-layered nature of human 
rights protection mentioned earlier, work on distinction between substantive and 
procedural violations of human rights (Gerards and Brems, 2017), and the growing 
attention given to dissenting opinions (White and Boussiakou, 2009). 
                                                          
18 Obviously, this idea of a closed, comprehensive system, capable of self-integration (which is a 
requirement for the guiding value of modern legal science, that is, the certainty of the law) has been 
criticised as a 'myth' since the end of the nineteenth century by all anti-formalist currents of law (Calvo, 
1994; van Gestel and Micklitz, 2011). 
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There is a further meaning of ‘criticism’, which is in my opinion the one that most 
lends itself as a route of escape from the ivory tower. I refer to the use of ‘critical’ in the 
expression 'critical theory', that is to say, those theories that enquire about essential nodes 
of social power relations (based on class, gender, race, disability, migrant status and other 
fundamental axes of subordination of groups of individuals in our societies). In the study 
of human rights, critical theories are the perspective that would make it possible to 
understand human rights, according to the Bobbian adage of human rights as a result of 
new struggles against old powers.19 The question of power is, therefore, a fundamental 
issue in human rights research.  
 
The investigation of power is always complicated, both because of the 
heterogeneous ways in which it manifests itself and because of its ability to become 
invisible, in particular, in contact with the law (which shows its institutionalised or 
‘naturalised’forms). It is important to reflect on how to deal with the issue of power in 
legal research and, in particular, in the legal doctrine of human rights.  
 
This is an even more urgent question if we take into account the current context 
of contestation of human rights. So far the issue of power has been almost exclusively 
approached by those who review human rights law from critical perspectives, namely, 
those who carry out an examination of the law from outside the law.20 The approach to 
the issue of power from within is hindered today by the hegemonic theory of human rights 
law: the so-called theory of generations of human rights. The theory of the generations of 
human rights is a narrative about rights that was imposed during the Cold War and became 
both the historiography and the dominant theory of human rights. Proposed by Karel 
Vasak in 1979, the theory classifies human rights into three separate groups: first-
generation human rights, which includes civil and political rights; second-generation 
human rights, which comprises economic, social and cultural rights, and third-generation 
human rights, made up of collective or solidarity rights. Each of the groups is explained 
on the basis of a different historical origin (the liberal revolutions, the democratisation 
processes and the proletarian movement of the nineteenth century, and the development 
processes linked to the post-colonial period, respectively). It is not just a historiography, 
since generations also function as analytical categories that explain the legal 
characteristics of each type of right: its legal nature, its right-holders and duty-bearers, 
and the type of associated guarantees. I agree with other authors (Jensen, 2017) that this 
is a fundamentally flawed theory (which actually concealed and sustained the ideological 
partition of the world in the Cold War).21 The theory of generations is an erroneous 
historiography of human rights (Jensen, 2017) and has no explanatory capacity from a 
legal point of view (Ferrajoli, 2011; Macklem, 2015). As a theoretical configuration, it 
                                                          
19“Human rights however fundamental are historical rights and therefore arise from specific conditions 
characterized by the embattled defence of new freedoms against old powers” (Bobbio, 1990, pp. XIII). 
20The literature is too broad to be cited: feminist, anti-racist, post-colonialist and de-colonialist perspectives, 
Critical Legal Studies and post-Marxist perspectives, to mention only the best known.   
21 Jensen noted how Vasak's initial work in 1977 was intended to promote the agenda of a third generation 
of rights to development, peace and a healthy environment (although its implementation was of little benefit 
to the effective development of these rights, since the duty-bearers were not even defined for the third-
generation rights).  
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also locks the definition of human rights to a series of historical ‘roots’ in a kind of 
genealogical determinism and establishes a strong hierarchy between them. It is essential 
to question it in order to appreciate the contestation of the definition of human rights by 
what is really a political phenomenon.  
 
By contesting the theory of generations, a discussion can be initiated about power 
in human rights rules. It must be borne in mind, however, that both the genesis of the 
Declaration and the prominence of the theory of generations have effectively hindered 
the development of theoretical knowledge of human rights, and that we are at a very early 
stage in this regard. If one asks people (not students, but scholars) or reviews scientific 
works and manifestos of international organisations about what human rights are, the 
outcome is discouraging. Colleagues and reference works do what children do when they 
are learning to speak: finger-pointing. Definitions of human rights are in most cases 
denotative definitions (provided by enumeration or by giving examples) and even 
ostensive definitions (by directly pointing the finger at the Declaration or some other 
treaty). Any attempt beyond that falls into the circular definition: ‘human rights are rights 
that are inherent to human beings.’ 
 
While the questioning of the so-called theory of generations and a renewed 
historiography of human rights (Jensen, 2016) suggested using new approaches to their 
definition and analysis, critical theories can and should play an important role in this 
development in order to preserve the ability to analyse human rights as an expression of 
power relations. Following the insights of other legal disciplines, when developing our 
theoretical and methodological assumptions about studying human rights law we must 
take into account that legal positivism (and the legal doctrine that is developed within that 
framework) prioritises the certainty of the law at the expense of excluding the challenges 
involved. Pierre Legrand warned that in the positive doctrines ‘certain knowledge is 
banished from the sphere of significance, and some issues are made never to arise, 
therefore allowing for (…) an ultimately immaculate development of internal heuristic 
processes generating ultimately immaculate legal results’ (Legrand, 2017, pp. 6-7). To 
avoid the epistemic self-referential and self-contained ivory tower, human rights legal 
scholars, as comparative law scholars, need to free themselves from the obsession with 
the certainty of law in legal positivism and recognise ‘the essential unruliness of legal 
texts and legal cultures’ (Legrand, 2017, p.44) also - or particularly so - in the human 
rights law systems.  
 
III.3. Co-work/Network 
 
The third escape route from the ivory tower is related to the 'crowded house' 
discussed in the previous section. The production of knowledge about human rights is a 
collective task in the hands of a heterogeneous plurality of subjects, who provide partial 
and sometimes fragmentary forms of knowledge.  
 
This leads us, again, to the need to consider the methodological characteristics of 
this multidisciplinary and multisectoral type of research; one partaken of by subjects 
whose interest in research is not the production of knowledge in itself, nor its 
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transmission, as in the case of scientific research, but its showcasing for practical purposes 
of social transformation or the defence of individual or collective interests.  
 
I disagree with the argument posed by Coomans et al. (2009 and 2010) that the 
root of the problem regarding the quality of human rights research is the confluence 
between academia and activism (whether in terms of individuals or work teams), or that 
activism has an agenda and practitioners have a function. This would be like holding that, 
for medical research to be good, it has to be indifferent to the ability of the results to 
effectively cure diseases. As Feldman argued, scientific knowledge for all fields ‘involves 
curiosity about the world, which may be stimulated either by the need to achieve a goal 
or by desire to understand something for its own sake’ (1989, pp. 502-503). But Coomans 
and his colleagues were right in proposing the use of methodology, or rather, of 
methodological rigour and the critical function, as instruments to curb ‘hagiography’ and 
rhetorical uses in the field of human rights (which are frequent in some areas more than 
others, although not only found among activists). 
 
A reflection on methodology can draw the areas of collaboration and the 
boundaries between human rights legal scholars and other actors who do research, but not 
scholarship, in the field of human rights. These lines would have the function of 
preserving the scientific aspirations of human rights legal scholarship, preventing its role 
from being reduced to being merely an ancillary instrument in the work of legal 
practitioners, human rights NGOs and policy-makers. Legal scholarship, in this way, can 
aspire not only to create more knowledge about the legal dimension of human rights, but 
also better knowledge, enhanced methods to approach that dimension, more 
accomplished theories to explain it, and better paradigms to integrate such knowledge 
with that of other disciplines. 
 
The confluence of academia and activists also has zones of friction, even when 
working on a common theoretical approach. One of the greatest difficulties we face in 
our doctoral programme, for example, is that we receive applications for admission from 
people who have been working in the field for years (with national and international 
organisations in humanitarian intervention, in human rights policy implementation 
programmes, etc.). It is challenging to explain the difference (as an intellectual activity 
and as a result) between the doctoral thesis and a report (however detailed and 
innovative). It is difficult both for those who need to explain it and for those who seek to 
understand the explanation. At a time when scholars are required to produce research at 
an increasingly fast pace, to direct it more towards measurable impacts, to bring it closer 
to the interests (or the needs) of public administrations, and ultimately increasingly closer 
to transfer than to basic research, it is problematic to define what it means to ‘push the 
boundaries of knowledge’, and what the degree of ambition should be in a doctoral 
project. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has reviewed some of the most common criticisms of the research 
conducted by human rights legal scholars in relation to some of its methodological 
deficits. According to critics, these deficits are based on poor, self-referential research 
results that are detached from the reality of human rights in people's lives, and lacking in 
terms of critical capacity. In order to escape from the ivory tower of human rights legal 
research, however, some new characteristics of the context must be taken into account. 
The field of human rights studies nowadays has a plurality of scientific disciplines; human 
rights are a contested concept (unlike what happened until the end of the twentieth 
century); and human rights law, which has developed spectacularly, has extremely 
complex characteristics related to the sources of law, degrees of regulation, interpretation 
mechanisms and guarantee systems. Taking into account both the criticism and the new 
context, three ‘escape routes from the ivory tower’ have been outlined that suggest some 
elements to initiate a methodological reflection in human rights legal research. First, the 
need to disclose the actual methodological reflection, to ensure that it enters the very 
process of exposure to criticism and can eventually improve, as typically found in 
scientific work; and also to be able to ‘translate’ legal research for the other disciplines 
with which we have to collaborate in the ‘crowded house’ of human rights. Second, the 
need to incorporate criticism, not only as a review of the system's malfunctions –as 
traditionally has been done in legal doctrine– but with a view to studying the complexity 
of the power relations reflected in the norms. If human rights are born in the ‘struggles in 
defence of new freedoms against old powers’, power relations need to be accounted for. 
And third, the need for academics, practitioners and activists to collaborate and use 
methodological reflection accurately, so as to delimit the forms and confines of that 
collaboration, preserving the function of each group and the scientific ambition of legal 
scholarship.  
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